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I. Introduction
Legal scholars who write about information and intellectual property (IP), especially 
those concerned with drawing appropriate boundaries between private and public 
domains, understandably have been mining the voluminous writings of the late Elinor 
(“Lin”) Ostrom for valuable lessons. Ostrom spent a lifetime studying the wide variety 
of property regimes used anywhere in the world for governing common-pool resources, 
primarily (but not exclusively) in the natural world (E. Ostrom 2010a, 2010c). Later in 
her career, Ostrom contributed applications of her frameworks, theories, and models to 
what she called the “knowledge commons.” (Hess & E. Ostrom 2007). She recognized 
the knowledge commons as a separate realm from the natural commons, which would 
not admit simple transfer of lessons learned from her earlier work, but required system-
atic study of its own resources, actors, institutions, action situations, and so forth. Each 
chapter in this book contributes to that systematic study.
2  Learning from Lin: Lessons and Cautions from  the Natural Commons for the Knowledge Commons
Daniel H. Cole*
* Daniel H. Cole is Professor of Law and of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, Bloomington, 
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46      Governing Knowledge Commons
This chapter offers guidance to IP scholars who are seeking to adapt, analogize to, 
or otherwise use Ostrom’s work to inform their own research. The main lessons are 
two: (1) those looking for normative guidance from Ostrom as to the proper structure of 
IP law are bound to be disappointed (or dishonest); but (2) those looking for conceptual, 
analytical, and methodological guidance will find it in Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework, which can (a)  improve IP scholars’ understand-
ing of information and information flows under alternative institutional arrangements;1 
(b) diagnose problems (or dilemmas) in existing institutional arrangements; and (c) in 
select cases predict outcomes under alternative institutional arrangements. Even then, 
normative implications will remain scarce (to nonexistent), and all predictions will be 
contingent and contestable. No panacean solutions to social dilemmas relating to infor-
mation will be discovered (Frischmann 2013).
Even analytical lessons from Ostrom’s work for IP scholars will be limited, as Madison, 
Frischmann, & Strandburg (2010) have observed, by an important distinction between 
natural common-pool resources and information or knowledge commons, which too 
often goes unremarked: they are very different kinds of goods, implying different gover-
nance mechanisms. Suffice it to say, at this point, that for natural common-pool resources 
“open access” is nearly always a problem requiring an institutional remedy, whereas in 
information commons it is a viable (though not necessarily preferable) institutional 
means of achieving social goals.
II. IP Scholars Seeking Normative Support from Ostrom’s Work Will Not Find It
Legal scholarship, including in the field of intellectual property (IP), is overwhelmingly 
normative. Scholars argue about what sets of rules should apply, and who should apply 
them, to interactions among individuals in society. In IP, nearly all of the biggest ques-
tions are normative: What constitutional limits should apply to copyright terms? What 
should be the scope of private ownership under copyright and patent laws? How best to 
resolve the tension between creating incentives to innovate, for example, by providing 
exclusive property rights, and facilitating market competition for the benefit of consum-
ers? What should be the scope of “fair use”? How best to prevent the proliferation of IP 
1 By “institutional arrangement,” I mean sets of rules implemented through some organizational structure. I gen-
erally follow Douglass North’s definition of an “institution” as a human-devised rule—whether a formal legal 
rule or an informal social norm—for structuring social interactions (North 1990: 3). For North, organizations 
are not institutions, but amalgams of actors. Elinor Ostrom defined “institutions” variously, but not inconsis-
tently, in her works (see Cole 2013: 390-391). Moreover, as Ostrom points out, her own definitions were consis-
tent with North’s understanding of the distinctions between “institutions” and “organizations” (see E. Ostrom 
2005: 179). However, in Ostrom’s analytical framework, it might sometimes at least be more useful to consider 
organizations as “action arenas” rather than as actors. For more on “action arenas” as part of Ostrom’s analytical 
framework, see infra.
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rights from creating tangled webs that perversely impede further innovations? Which, if 
any, innovations that contribute to the stock of useful knowledge fall immediately into 
the “knowledge commons”? Which should never do so?
That IP law is dominated by such normative issues is not surprising. After all, laws are 
(or embody) norms.2 Few other academic disciplines are so heavily normative in focus as 
legal studies. Most social-scientific disciplines, and scholars within those disciplines, tend 
to be more analytical than normative in their approaches and methods.3
Elinor Ostrom’s work provides a veritable model of social-scientific analysis. She 
focused on constructing empirically informed frameworks, theories, and models that 
were (1)  conceptually clear; (2)  thickly descriptive (embracing complexity); (2)  diag-
nostic; (3)  analytically rigorous; and (4)  integrative of configural interactions among 
explanatory factors, suggesting patterns of social interactions and their social-ecological 
consequences—as with the “design principles” from Governing the Commons (E. Ostrom 
1990). The integration of explanatory factors might sometimes allow for (tentative) 
predictions about the (relative) success or failure of similar institutional applications in 
similar social-ecological circumstances. But rarely, if ever, will a reader of her work come 
across an expressly normative argument (unless one considers to be “normative” her fre-
quent arguments about the importance of conceptual clarity and interdisciplinary coop-
eration using multiple methods).
Throughout much of her work, Ostrom evinced one substantive normative com-
mitment to the principle of self-governance, as reflected in the “polycentric approach” 
pioneered by her husband, the political theorist Vincent Ostrom (V. Ostrom 1999; 
V.  Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren 1961; E.  Ostrom 2009a, 2009b, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 
2012). That approach embodies a normative principle of subsidiarity according to which 
governance is a “coresponsibility” of units at central (or national), regional (subnational), 
and local levels (see Decentralization: A Sampling of Omissions). But even that commit-
ment to polycentricism was contingent, context-specific, and focused on matching the 
scale of governance to the scale of operations appropriate for the particular production 
or provision problem under investigation. For example, in her early studies of munici-
pal versus neighborhood policing in Indianapolis, Indiana, Ostrom hypothesized that 
smaller police departments would function more effectively (according to a variable 
of criteria) than would highly consolidated, metropolitan police departments. But her 
empirical research revealed that medium-size police departments overall outperformed 
both smaller (neighborhood) and larger (municipal-level) units (E. Ostrom, Parks, & 
2 More specifically, they are the formal “rules of the game,” which, together with informal social norms, structure 
social interactions (see North 1990: 3).
3 The recent rise of empirical legal scholarship and other applications of social-scientific methodologies to law 
have reduced, but not eliminated, the dominance of normative legal scholarship. On the rise of empirical legal 
scholarship, see, e.g., Heise (2002). On more general applications of social-scientific methodologies to law, see, 
e.g., Lempert & Sanders (1986); Monahan &Walker (2009); Baird, Gertner, & Picker (1998).
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Whitaker 1978).4 Thus, polycentricism itself was not immune to Ostrom’s oft-repeated 
injunction that there are no institutional panaceas for resolving complex social dilemmas 
(E. Ostrom 2007).
Aside from her strong (but contingent) commitment to polycentricism, the relevance 
of which is unclear in the context of the information or knowledge commons, the goal of 
Ostrom’s work never was to promote specific social outcomes. Though she is sometimes 
portrayed as an “advocate” for local self-governance using common-property regimes, she 
really was only a proponent of the idea that such governance systems are sometimes suc-
cessful according to some evaluative criterion, such as sustainability of the resource base 
over time. As such, she argued that scholars should not summarily exclude, as Garrett 
Hardin (1968) did, common-property regimes from comparative analyses of alterna-
tive institutional solutions to social-ecological dilemmas.5 Ostrom did not believe local 
self-governance was the answer to resource overuse problems any more than public own-
ership/regulation or private ownership/markets (E. Ostrom, Janssen, & Anderies 2007; 
Frischmann 2012). Again, there are no panaceas—no universal, first-best, institutional 
solutions to inevitably complex social dilemmas (E. Ostrom 2011–2012; Acheson 2011).
That Elinor Ostrom, like many other social scientists, elevated analytical and meth-
odological considerations over normative arguments creates an insuperable problem for 
legal scholars who would appropriate her frameworks, theories, and models to further 
their own normative policy preferences, whether in natural resources law or IP law. It 
just won’t work. No one can point to anything in any of Ostrom’s voluminous writings 
that would support arguments that, for example, IP rights should be more restricted than 
they are at present or the scope of “fair use” should be broader (or narrower).6 Ostrom 
might (or might not) have agreed personally with those normative assertions, but noth-
ing in her work on local common-property regimes, including the “design principles” she 
derived in Governing the Commons, supports normative conclusions.
That might seem odd, given that Ostrom’s famous IAD framework, which predated 
Governing the Commons, has a box devoted to “Evaluative Criteria.” The purpose of that 
box was to adjudge, as people inevitably do, social and ecological outcomes of social inter-
actions in which actors, holding designated positions, behave strategically but in general 
accordance with “rules-in-use.”7 It would seem that any such evaluative criteria must 
4 More generally, Ostrom and her co-authors found little empirical support for conventional presumptions of 
constant economies of scale in provision of public services. They found both economies of scale and disecono-
mies of scale, depending on the types of public services being provided and the circumstances (e.g., community 
attributes) in which they were being provided.
5 On comparative institutional analysis, see, e.g., Cole (2013); Komesar (1994); Aoki (2001).
6 One arguable exception is mentioned in Section 6 below, where I claim that Ostrom (and co-author Charlotte 
Hess) simply (perhaps “casually” would be a better word) erred in implying that open-access information repos-
itories invariably are a “positive” outcome of collective action and proprietary information systems with gated 
access invariably are a “negative” outcome. If anything, this example is so exceptional that it proves the rule that 
Ostrom was exceedingly reluctant to make or support sweeping normative generalizations.
7 The IAD framework is set out in much more detail, infra.
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themselves be normative or at least imply normative consequences. Tellingly, Ostrom 
herself paid scant attention to the “Evaluative Criteria” box in her IAD framework, but 
recognized that the box might be populated by various (not necessarily consistent) cri-
teria. For example, she referred to alternative evaluative criteria, including (1) economic 
efficiency, (2) fiscal equivalence, (3) redistributional equity, (4) accountability, (5) con-
formance to values of local actors, and (6) sustainability, and noted the need to make 
trade-offs among evaluative criteria (E. Ostrom 2011). Ostrom’s decision to avoid com-
mitting to a specific evaluative criterion or set of criteria was quite intentional. Her goal 
was to provide a framework for analysis consistent with a wide variety of theories and 
models, which might embody varying normative commitments. Indeed, she contended 
that her IAD framework was congenial to microeconomic theory, game theory, transac-
tion cost theory, social cost theory, public choice, and constitutional and covenantal the-
ory, along with theories of public goods and common-pool resources (E. Ostrom 2005: 
28; Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010). Such a diversity of theories could only be 
compatible with the IAD framework if the framework itself was not tilted to favor one 
or more of them to the detriment of others. Moreover, as recognized by the editors of 
this book and incorporated into their adapted version of the IAD framework, Evaluative 
Criteria often are, or can be, based on the relevant community’s explicit (and sometimes 
implicit) objectives.
The most that can be said is that, in a social-ecological systems context, Ostrom 
assumed that more robust and resilient resource-management regimes tended to be more 
successful (perhaps by definition) and, therefore, better. From that point, we might legiti-
mately argue that the “design principles” from Governing the Commons were informed 
by an implicit normative commitment to long-run sustainability of social-ecological 
systems—hardly a controversial policy goal in the context of natural resources. Indeed, 
the widespread agreement about that implicit normative goal of sustainability, among 
diverse scholars with varying normative commitments, may have enabled Ostrom to pay 
less attention to “evaluative criteria” than would have been necessary in the absence of 
such consensus.
III. What IP Scholars Can Learn from Ostrom: Conceptual, Analytical, and 
Methodological Lessons
Setting normative considerations to one side, Ostrom’s work has a great deal to offer IP 
scholars seeking to understand and diagnose IP problems, and possibly (just possibly) to 
predict outcomes from interactions under alternative IP arrangements. Indeed, unlike 
many of her fellow political scientists who have fallen in love with abstract models and 
statistical analyses for their own sakes, Ostrom was never satisfied if her research did not 
yield policy-relevant insights. Indeed, she possessed a unique ability to simultaneously 
combine scientific rigor with policy relevance. But she always was more interested in 
informing policy, than pushing it in one direction or another.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I  will suggest that Ostrom’s work offers (at least) 
two useful and applicable analytical and methodological lessons for IP scholars, including 
(1) the importance of conceptual clarity, particularly in distinguishing between resource 
attributes, institutions, and actors; and (2) the IAD framework (or some variant of it) for 
understanding social interactions structured in substantial part by IP rights.8 Using the 
IAD framework and comparing cases, models, and experimental outcomes might allow 
scholars eventually (after several years of research design, implementation, data collec-
tion, and analysis) to develop something like the “design principles” Ostrom derived for 
local common-property regimes used to govern common-pool resources.9 Such principles 
might (or might not) facilitate predictions of circumstances in which one combination 
of public, common, and private rights (and duties) in “common pools” of information 
might work better (or worse) than alternative combinations. Her primary purpose in 
setting them out was not to enable prediction but merely to identify “underlying regulari-
ties” in local common-property regimes (E. Ostrom 2010a: 16).10
A. The Paramount Importance of Conceptual Clarity
Legends abound of three-hour (or longer) meetings at Vincent and Elinor Ostrom’s 
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University devoted entirely 
to defining a single term or concept. These were not mere scholastic exercises but prac-
tical and important efforts to facilitate cross-disciplinary understanding, so that schol-
ars from diverse academic backgrounds (including, but not limited to, anthropology, 
economics, game theory, history, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, pub-
lic administration, and sociology), using different analytical tools and methods, could 
work together effectively to describe, diagnose, analyze, and possibly resolve commons 
problems. In the absence of an agreed vocabulary—or, at least, clearly defined terms—
cross-disciplinary communication suffers, and progress toward resolving social dilemmas 
8 The value of the IAD framework already has been recognized by IP scholars writing from various disciplinary 
perspectives about the information or knowledge commons. See, e.g., Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 
(2010); Tenenberg (2008); and Schweik & English (2007).
9 Ostrom’s phrase “design principles” can be misleading. She did not mean necessarily to imply either the imple-
mentation of a strategic plan or a designer. See Becker & Ostrom 1995: 122 (“one should not presume that 
there was a conscious overall plan to develop institutions that met the design principles. Rather, the design 
principles are an effort of careful observers to identify commonalities that help to account for sustainability 
of fragile resources over very long periods of time.”). Ostrom, herself, has regretted confusion arising from 
the phrase “design principles” and has suggested “best practices” as an alternative (E. Ostrom 2010c: 14, n.5). 
However, given the normative implication of the word “best,” the substitute phrase might prove just as mis-
leading as “design principles.” In any case, a recent meta-analysis testing the “design principles” from Governing 
the Commons found them robust overall (see Cox et al. 2010).
10 Perhaps the phrase “underlying regularities” (or “regularly observed characteristics”) might be more fitting than 
either “design principles” or “best practices” for denoting the attributes of successful commons-management 
regimes.
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of shared concern is obstructed.11 That concern motivated creation of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which is addressed in the following 
subsection. Scholars adopting that framework essentially commit to “a common set of 
linguistic elements that can be used to analyze a wide diversity of problems,” including 
potentially those relating to the information or knowledge commons (E. Ostrom 2010b).
Ostrom was not an IP scholar; nor am I.  So I  will not presume to recommend that 
IP scholars simply adopt or adapt the shared vocabulary that Ostrom “Workshoppers”12 
developed over the course of many years of long and often contentious discussions. Despite 
Ostrom’s goal of generating a shared vocabulary and framework for analysis universally 
applicable over the wide range of social dilemmas (E. Ostrom 2005: 6), it is entirely possible 
that the different attributes and issues of the knowledge commons will require deviations 
from or emendation of existing frameworks and vocabularies. Indeed, the editors of this 
book have undertaken to adapt Ostrom’s IAD framework to the problems of the informa-
tion or knowledge commons (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010), and this book 
continues that project. Undoubtedly, however, similar interdisciplinary problems can be 
expected to arise (if they have not arisen already) among scholars in the “IP wars,” who 
make up an even broader group coming not just from the traditional social sciences and 
the law but also from informatics, computer science, engineering, and biotechnology.
A few examples might suffice to indicate the types of conceptual issues that require, if 
not consensus, then at least clarification to allow those various scholars (and non-scholar 
stakeholders) to understand one another.13 For one, IP scholars surely will want to 
heed Ostrom’s caution about the potential for confusing or conflating resource sys-
tems (which, in the case of IP scholars, are the information, data, or knowledge) with 
either the humanly devised institutional settings for managing those resources (e.g., 
property and regulatory systems) or with the actors who (a)  create, innovate, or dis-
cover new information (re)sources and/or (b) structure the institutional structures for 
managing information.14 In the natural commons context, we are careful to distinguish 
11 What is achieved in the absence of a clearly defined and agreed-upon vocabulary is what the philosopher 
David Lewis (1969) referred to as a “babbling equilibrium” (see also Ostrom 2005: 176).
12 A  “Workshopper” is an affiliated faculty member, visiting scholar, graduate student, or staffer in Indiana 
University’s Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, which in 2012 was named for its founders, 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom.
13 Ostrom insisted that everyone should use each term of art, such as “institution,” in precisely the same way. For 
example, Hess & E. Ostrom (2003: 114) stress the need for “shared meanings.” In my view, legitimate reasons 
exist for scholars to use the same term in different ways, depending on what functions those terms are serving 
in their analysis. See Cole (2013). However, if social scientists and legal scholars are to tolerate diverse mean-
ings of similar terms, it becomes imperative for individual scholars to define with utmost care terms amenable 
to multiple meanings in every paper they write. Moreover, even if Ostrom’s insistence on “shared meanings” 
is unduly strict, her goal of achieving widespread, or even universal, agreement of a common framework for 
analysis and of variables within that framework remains crucial for enabling meta-analyses of case studies and 
coding for quantitative empirical analysis.
14 Indeed, some IP scholars already have heeded this lesson. See Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg (2010) and 
this volume.
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common-pool resources (CPRs)—naturally existing systems with various biophysical 
attributes—and common-property regimes (also CPRs), which are human-created sets 
of institutions for managing common-pool resources (among others). In the case of the 
information or knowledge commons, it is equally important to distinguish the informa-
tion itself, with whatever attributes it might have, from whatever system(s), including IP 
laws, humans set up to control or manage it and its flow.
Another issue requiring careful attention and clarification is specification of differ-
ent kinds or types of information and information flows, with diverse characteristics and 
attributes, perhaps warranting differential governance. Already we have a substantially 
different governance system, patents, for dealing with certain kinds of scientific infor-
mation, as compared with artistic information, which is governed by copyright law (or 
sometimes placed in the “creative commons”). Trade names, trade secrets, fiduciary and 
other privileged communications, evidence submitted under oath, computer code, and 
many other types of information and flows are all dealt with in various ways in the legal 
system.
Likewise various fora of information exchange, such as e-mail, telecommunications, 
police interrogations, court sessions, legislative and administrative committee hearings, 
face-to-face business meetings (with or without written minutes), and personal com-
munications are subject to very different kinds of procedural and sometimes substantive 
rules (not to mention informal social norms). Much has been written already about all 
of these types of information and information-exchange by scholars and advocates (occa-
sionally one and the same) from various disciplines and a variety of perspectives. Much 
work remains to be done, however, to systematize and meta-analyze this vast quantity of 
“data” so as to develop the kinds of theories and “design principles” that Ostrom and her 
colleagues painstakingly developed and applied over the course of decades, with some 
measure of success, to specifying and diagnosing problems of the natural commons. The 
existing IAD framework (or some variation on it) could be very useful to such an effort, 
and the adapted IAD framework developed and applied in this book paves the way.
B. Potential for Applying the IAD Framework to the 
Information or Knowledge Commons
As noted earlier, the IAD framework originally was created in large part to facilitate schol-
arly cooperation by providing a common framework based on a shared vocabulary that 
would be amenable to diverse assumptions, theories, and models of social interaction. 
The framework itself is deceptively simple in design, but allows for detailed analyses of 
highly complex interactions of however many variables (and subvariables) are of interest. 
It is the most widely used framework in studies of the natural commons (Constantinidis 
2012), and has been cited as one of the most important analytical tools of the policy 
process (Sabatier 2007). As a legal scholar, I have long wondered why a framework so 
obviously congenial to legal analysis has not found wider application in my own field 
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(including, I confess, in my own work). Perhaps it is due to the overwhelming normativ-
ity of legal scholarship, discussed earlier. Regardless, IP scholars (lawyers and nonlawyers 
alike) should find the IAD framework an immensely useful tool for disentangling the 
various elements that make up social problems relating to information and information 
flows, understanding those elements, and diagnosing more precisely where the roots of 
problems lie, enabling (but never guaranteeing) collective action to resolve those prob-
lems via new or amended institutions.
Several, marginally different, versions exist of the IAD framework. The version dis-
cussed below is fairly standard, and comes from Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess’s ini-
tial efforts to extend the commons framework to the “knowledge commons.”
1. Biophysical Characteristics and Different Types of Goods
Starting with the three boxes vertically aligned along the left side of the framework, the 
“Biophysical Characteristics” of the resource probably have less significance for informa-
tion than for a natural commons. After all, ideas have no biophysical attributes (unless 
we treat them purely as electrical or chemical outputs of cognition via neurotransmis-
sion). Nevertheless, Ostrom and co-author Charlotte Hess identified several bases for 
distinguishing varying physical characteristics of information:  facilities through which 
information is accessed, including bookstores, libraries (public, academic, or private), 
newspapers, the Internet (including both open-access and subscription-based sources 
of various kinds); artifacts, which are the discreet physical forms through which infor-
mation flows and in which it is accessed, including maps, books, and computer files (to 
name just a few); ideas themselves, which are the “nonphysical flow units” of the resource 
(E. Ostrom & Hess 2007:  47–48). Obviously, much more work remains to be done 
Biophysical
Characteristics 
Attributes
of the
Community  
Rules-in-Use
Action
Arena 
Action
Situations 
Actors 
Patterns of
Interaction
Outcomes
Evaluative
Criteria 
figure 2.1 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework.
Source: Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in 
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice 44, Fig. 3-1 (Charlotte Hess 
& E. Ostrom eds., MIT Press 2007).
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elaborating on these tentative categories, and IP scholars (along with others who work in 
fields diverse as cognitive psychology, informatics, and semiotics) are better positioned to 
carry out this work than those of us who focus on natural resources.
Related to the discussion of “biophysical characteristics” is a tricky problem of defining 
just what kind of good (if it is a single kind of good) information actually is. Widespread 
agreement seems to exist that ideas, once they are released into the world from any source, 
are in the nature of pure public goods. They meet the strict conditions of nonrivalrousness 
in consumption and nonexcludability. Very few other public goods (or goods with pub-
lic attributes) are so pure. Even goods traditionally thought to be virtually pure public 
goods, such as sunlight, lighthouses, and the atmosphere, are less pure public goods than 
ideas. Solar access disputes have shown that sunlight can, in some circumstances, be rival-
rous in consumption.15 Ronald Coase has argued that, in special cases at least, the exter-
nal benefits provided by lighthouses can be recaptured by suppliers (Coase 1974; but see 
Van Zandt 199316). And since the industrial revolution it has become clear that the atmo-
sphere, like waters, forests, and other natural resources, is at best an impure, subtractable, 
or congestible public good. As such, these resources fall somewhere on the spectrum 
between public goods, as technically defined, and club or toll goods. It is such impure 
public goods to which Ostrom assigned the label “common-pool resources” (Ostrom & 
Ostrom 1999: 75). She spent no time studying pure public goods, which by definition 
are not candidates for the “tragedy of the commons” because they would survive, undi-
minished, regardless of whatever institutional structures were introduced to sustain or 
exploit them. It is doubtful, however, that any natural resources actually meet the strict 
requirements of nonrivalrousness and nonexcludability.
To the extent information (in the raw form of “ideas”) is a pure public good, the 
implications for governance are quite different from the case of common-pool natural 
resources, where “open access” (at least where demands on the resource are increasing 
relative to supply) leads inexorably to “tragedy,” as Hardin surmised. All solutions to the 
“tragedy of the commons” involve the replacement of open access with restricted access 
and use via private property, common property, or public property/regulatory regimes 
(Cole 2002). Open access (signifying the absence of restraints on access and use) is always 
the socially optimal governance system for existing pure public goods simply because it is 
inevitable under conditions of nonrivalrousness and nonexcludability. Consequently, if 
IP scholars were concerned only about information in its purest form—as ideas—then 
neither Ostrom’s analytical framework nor any other approach would be at all useful 
15 See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982); Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five 
Twenty-Five Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959).
16 Van Zandt claims that Coase was describing a special case because such a high percentage of global shipping 
traffic used the Port of London during the period Coase was describing, and notes that the government sub-
sidized private provision of lighthouse services by giving lighthouse owners taxation powers in the Port of 
London.
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because no social dilemmas (or governance problems) would exist. However, that is not 
the prevailing situation.
In fact, IP institutions matter a great deal not because of the ideas themselves (although 
IP policy rightfully is concerned with incentives for the production of ideas, especially 
those that contribute to the “stock of useful knowledge” (Kuznets 1965: 85–87)) but with 
what we might call, to borrow a phrase from mythology and semiotics, “ideas-in-form”—
ideas as represented in texts, pictures, symbols and marks, scores or recordings, codes, and 
so forth. These are what Ostrom and Hess call “artifacts.” In contrast to the ideas they 
contain, the artifacts are not pure public goods; in fact, some of them, such as closely held 
secrets (think of the formulae for the original Coca-Cola or Kentucky Fried Chicken), 
are more nearly pure private goods than any kind of public goods.17 Other artifacts, such 
as books, are not so easily subjected to institutional control because, even though exclu-
sion is relatively easy, they remain relatively nonrivalrous in consumption. Books are easy 
to resell, gift, or lend, so that the ideas they contain can be freely accessed by many (with 
no diminution in the amount available for anyone else to consume, so long as the book 
itself remains intact). Nonetheless, institutional arrangements can, with greater or lesser 
success, control the flow of ideas themselves by controlling access to and use of the arti-
facts that contain them as well as the “facilities” through which information is accessed. 
In addition, by controlling the flow of ideas, institutions (including IP rights and duties) 
can impact the rate of production, and/or the direction, of new ideas, as in the case of 
alleged “patent trolls” (compare Magliocca 2013 and McDonough 2006).
2. Attributes of the Community
The middle box on the left of the IAD framework, labeled “Attributes of the Community,” 
arguably requires fewer adjustments in the move from the natural commons to the knowl-
edge commons. As already noted, the relevant community of the information or knowl-
edge commons is much larger than most of the communities with whom scholars of the 
natural common-pool resources have dealt. Indeed, moving the IAD framework from 
the resource commons to the knowledge commons involves a wholly new participant of 
central concern: the creator (or producer). Typically, a natural common-pool resource 
has no human producer.18 Thus, the position of “creator” has not been encountered by 
scholars employing the IAD framework. The various other “actors” are more familiar, 
17 The ideas contained in the formulae are public goods, but the formulae themselves (the “artifacts”) are private 
goods because of ease of excludability, even if they might in theory be nonrival in consumption.
18 Artificially created “natural” commons do exist; think of stocked fisheries. Moreover, I can easily imagine a 
philosopher arguing that even what counts as a “natural resource” is, in part, a product of human conceptual-
ization. Thus, all common-pool resources would be at least coproduced or co-created by humans. But I suggest 
we cabin such issues for purposes of the current discussion, where the distinction between humans as creators 
of natural and creators of artificial resources seems important regardless of the relation between humans and 
natural resource systems.
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including providers, financers, distributors, millions of potential or actual users, and of 
course policy makers who establish “rules of the game” for information production, pro-
vision, distribution, and consumption.
It is, to repeat, an unusually large community compared to those traditionally studied 
by Ostrom and other students of the natural commons. Although, problems of the global 
commons, such as climate change, certainly would challenge the information commons for 
size and variety of attributes, including number of actors. It is worth observing that Ostrom 
wrote a good deal about climate change in her later years, but never attempted to apply 
the IAD framework to that problem of the global commons (see Ostrom 2012; E. Ostrom 
2010a). Was she daunted by the scale of the application?19 If so, might her reluctance signify 
the scale of the challenge IP scholars face in applying the framework to the information 
commons? It is worth noting in this context that the few efforts to apply the IAD frame-
work in the realm of the information or knowledge commons so far have focused on dis-
crete subparts of the problem or applied only subparts of the IAD framework, which seems 
sensible and perhaps inevitable (see Tenenberg 2008 (a full application of the IAD frame-
work to a case study of student software teams in an undergraduate course at the University 
of Washington, Tacoma); Schewik & Kitsing 2010 (an application of one important aspect 
of the IAD framework, the various kinds of rules that apply in action arenas or situations, 
to open-source governance systems)). This book reflects the most significant effort yet to 
adapt, extend, and apply the IAD framework to the knowledge commons, and in doing 
so, much more attention is directed toward analysis of the various communities involved.
3. Rules-in-Use
Little needs to be explained to legal scholars (at least) about the box at the bottom-left of 
the IAD framework, other than that the concept of “rules-in-use” occasionally misleads 
some social scientists into believing that the “rules-in-form”—the formal legal rules—do 
not matter at all, as if they could not even influence the rules-in-use (Kinston & Caballero 
2009: 158 (mistakenly but approvingly attributing to Ostrom a belief that rules-in-form 
are “dead letters,” while rules-in-use are “rules which are actually followed”)). Certainly 
since Robert Ellickson’s famous book on the cattle ranchers of Shasta County, California 
(Ellickson 1991), if not earlier (Pound 1910; Llewellyn 1949; Friedman 1975), legal scholars 
have understood the important and highly variable relations between formal legal norms 
and informal social norms. IP scholars have noted, for example, a disjunction between 
formal legal rules barring Internet file sharing and social norms of sharing among Internet 
users (Feldman & Nadler 2006). But no legal scholar doubts that the formal legal rules 
remain very important (if not always the most important institutional variables).
19 I hasten immediately to cast doubt on the implicit assertion by observing that Elinor Ostrom was not daunted 
by much of anything during the course of her long career. It is entirely possible that she did not apply the IAD 
framework to the problem of the “climate commons” merely for lack of sufficient time, given her other innu-
merable obligations.
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The question remains, where do the rules (in form or in use) come from? They are 
the outcomes (or outputs) of prior action situations taking place at various levels. 
Constitutional-level interactions result in meta-rules (which may or may not be codified 
in a single document called a “constitution”), rules that establish processes and proce-
dures for adopting collective choice–level rules (statutes, decisions, administrative rules, 
etc.). Collective choice–level arenas include (but are not limited to) courts, legislative 
bodies, administrative agencies, corporate board rooms, club committees, school boards, 
church conclaves and synods, faculty meetings, and the family kitchen. Rules adopted in 
those arenas structure everyday interactions at the “operational level.” Even at that level, 
however, rule making goes on. Social norms, which may be as or more powerful than for-
mal legal rules, emerge from regularized patterns of interaction in operational-level situ-
ations. The scholar’s task, in applying the IAD framework, is to determine, and diagnose 
perceived problems with, the rules-in-use that govern day-to-day (“operational-level”) 
interactions in the action situations under study. In the IP context, this might be a slightly 
easier chore than in many natural commons contexts, where determining the rules 
requires close observation of, and interaction with, local communities for long periods of 
time. As a highly top-down system of governance, the basic contours of the rule-structure 
governing various types of information can be discerned from studying national statutes 
and cases brought under those statutes. In other words, the relative lack of polycentricity 
in the IP governance system should make it, all else being equal, an easier governance 
system to comprehend.
In 2005, Ostrom and her Workshop colleague, Sue Crawford, classified (functionally) 
various types of rules that apply in action situations (E. Ostrom & Crawford 2005: 186–
215) including the following (incomplete list):
Position rules Define positions that actors hold, including as owners of property rights 
and duties.
Boundary 
rules
Define: (1) Who is eligible to take a position;
(2) The process for choosing who is eligible to take a position;
(3) How actors can leave positions;
(4) Whether anyone can hold multiple positions simultaneously;
(5) Succession to vacant positions.
Choice rules Define what actors in positions must, must not, or may do in their 
position and in particular circumstances.
Aggregation 
rules
Determine whether a decision by a single actor or multiple actors is 
needed prior to acting at a decision point in a process.
Information 
rules
Specify channels of communication among actors, as well as the kinds of 
information that can be transmitted between positions.
Payoff rules Assign external rewards or sanctions for particular actions or outcomes.
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Ostrom (2005: 189, Fig. 7.1) provides the following graph to illustrate how the various 
rules affect activity within the action arena or situation.
Among the more significant positional rules, for both natural commons and the infor-
mation or knowledge commons, are property rights and duties. In 1992, Ostrom and 
Edella Schlager identified several components of private property ownership (Schlager & 
E. Ostrom 1992: 250–51; compare with Honoré 1961: 107, identifying nine distinct rights 
and two duties in the full, “fee simple” ownership):
4. Not “Exogenous Variables” but “Initial Conditions”
One further point of clarification about the three boxes on the left side of the IAD 
framework needs to be made before we bring them, as inputs, into the action arena or 
Access Right to enter a defined area and enjoy its benefits without removing any 
resources.
Withdrawal Right to obtain specified products from a resource system and remove 
that product from the area for prescribed uses.
Management Right to participate in decisions regulating resources or making 
improvements in infrastructure.
Exclusion Right to participate in the determination of who has, and who does not 
have, access to and use of resources.
Alienation Right to sell, lease, bequeath, or otherwise transfer any or all of the 
preceding component rights.
Payoff
rules
Scope
rules
Information
rules
Boundary
rules
ACTORS
INFORMATION
about
CONTROL
over
Linked to
NET COSTS
AND BENEFITS
assigned toACTIONS
POSITIONS POTENTIAL
OUTCOMES
assigned to
assigned to
Position
rules
Choice
rules
Aggregation
rules
figure 2.2 Rules as Exogenous Variables Directly Affecting the Elements of an Action Situation.
Source: Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity 189, Fig. 7.1 (Princeton University 
Press 2005).
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situation:  Ostrom sometimes referred to those three boxes as “exogenous variables” 
(E. Ostrom 2005: 15, Fig. 1.2). But that is inaccurate. Because of the recursive nature of 
the framework—feedback from outcomes of action situations effects, either directly or 
mediated through evaluative criteria, resource attributes, community attributes, and 
rules-in-use—they are endogenized within the framework. At best, they constitute sets 
of “initial conditions” immediately preceding any particular social interaction. It might 
make even more sense to say that they are the prevailing conditions (or “entry condi-
tions”) upon a social interaction.20
5. The Action Arena (or Situation): Where Collective Action Happens (or Not)
The action arena (or situation) is where social interactions occur. It is the place—often 
these days a virtual place—where:  individual actors make decisions that affect social 
welfare; collective action succeeds or fails; rules are made; entitlements to resources 
are allocated; exchanges take place (or not); and disputes are adjudicated. If and when 
institutional change occurs, it occurs in action arenas or situations (Hess & E. Ostrom 
2007: 54).
As already noted, action arenas or situations exist at three different levels of gover-
nance in the IAD framework:  the constitutional-choice level, the collective-choice 
level, and the operational level. And what happens in various action arenas at those 
different levels impacts on relevant resources (e.g., how information is provided, to 
whom, and under what circumstances), attributes of the relevant community, and the 
rules-in-use (both formal and informal). Ostrom and Hess, for example, have used the 
creation of digital repositories of scholarship to exemplify how rule systems are created 
through collective-choice interactions, and affect the incentives of individual actors in 
operational-level interactions (Hess & E. Ostrom 2007: 54–57).
The individual actors participating in action arenas or situations are typically presumed 
to be either completely or boundedly rational (following Herbert Simon, who greatly 
influenced Ostrom’s work) (Simon 1972: 161), depending on the theory-based preference 
of the analyst; either way, actors can be expected to behave strategically to further their 
own interests (as subjectively determined). This feature makes Ostrom’s IAD framework 
almost uniquely compatible with multiple theories and models, including: neoclassical 
theory, game theory, public choice theory, and behavioral economics, with the exception 
of (usually deterministic) models of irrational behavior (see, e.g., Berridge 2003: 17).
Pursuant to rules discussed above, actors in action arenas hold a variety of “positions,” 
depending on the choice-level (constitutional, collective-choice, or operational). At the 
constitutional level, they may be appointed members of the constitutional convention, 
members of state ratifying conventions, journalists, scholars, members of interest groups 
20 Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg (2010) modify the IAD framework in part to account for the com-
plex feedback mechanisms and interactions across the framework components in the knowledge commons 
context.
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attempting to affect the outcomes of constitutional negotiations, judges determining 
compliance with constitutional process rules, and so forth. At the collective-choice (or 
policy) level, positions include legislators (junior and senior) with various congressional 
or party leadership roles, as well as committee assignments and positions, legislative and 
committee staff members, lobbyists, hearing witnesses, parliamentarians, official report-
ers, and journalists, among others. In operational-level action arenas, participants include 
buyers, sellers, owners, renters, contractors, disputants, fiduciary, beneficiary, player, 
coach—the whole panoply of roles that humans take on in social interactions of all kinds 
in everyday life.
Operating within the scope of their respective positions (that is, according to the 
rules), and strategically according to their own (boundedly) rational interests and prefer-
ences (as they subjectively see them), actors choose among available action alternatives in 
light of information they possess about how potential actions (as well as inaction) link to 
potential outcomes, including costs and benefits (McGinnis 2011: 173–74). In addition 
to the costs and benefits internalized to the individual actors, their individual decisions 
may well have social consequences, entailing significant net costs or benefits for the com-
munity. Indeed, if that were not the case, society would not confront any social-cost or 
public-goods problems (broadly put, social dilemmas) requiring collective action.
Studying social interactions at constitutional, collective-choice, and operational levels 
allows scholars to observe regularities (and irregularities) in patterns of interaction. In 
many cases, regularized patterns of interaction will represent an equilibrium (although 
not necessarily a unique, efficient, or Nash equilibrium) for the actors. In other cases, the 
equilibrium might be difficult to discern or, in especially conflicted and contested situ-
ations, might not actually exist (even over long periods of time). When an equilibrium 
or regularized pattern of interactions is observed, patterns of interaction themselves may 
constitute or reflect norms of social behavior previously known (from the “rules-in-use” 
box) or unknown. Most importantly, apparent equilibria may be subject to shocks (exog-
enous or endogenous) that can alter patterns (or norms) of interaction, depending on 
their robustness and resilience.
6. Outcomes
In a sense, observed patterns of interaction are outcomes of social interactions. For exam-
ple, in the legal action situation of automobile accident disputes, out-of-court settlements 
are both an observed regularity of interactions among actors (or parties) and outcomes 
of the proceedings (Ross 1980: 179 (2,123 of 2,216 cases disposed of by settlement before 
trial)). Similarly, in the legislative action arena of Congress, the so-called “Mickey Mouse 
rule” of IP policy, whereby Congress extends copyright terms retroactively whenever 
the Disney character Mickey Mouse is about to fall into the public domain, reflects 
an observed regularity of interactions (among players including legislators, lobbyists, 
and expert witnesses), amounting to an equilibrium situation (which is not to say the 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Fri May 30 2014, NEWGEN
Frischmann180214OUS_Book.indb   60 5/30/2014   3:17:48 PM
Learning from Lin      61
equilibrium necessarily is efficient) (see, e.g., Posner 2003). That pattern of interaction 
is itself a predictable outcome of the structure of interests and incentives created by exist-
ing sets of institutions (pursuant to theories of public choice) (Landes & Posner 2004). 
Meanwhile, the equilibrium patterns of interaction yield predictable outcomes of specific 
legislative processes to extend the copyright law at regular intervals.
Importantly, outcomes of interactions frequently entail effects that extend beyond the 
interacting parties to the broader society. So, in a natural commons setting outcomes 
frequently include consequences for the resource systems and resource units themselves, 
as well as for those who use the resources (on a broad interpretation of the word “use”). 
A collective choice–level interaction that displaces “open access” governance with “regu-
lated access and use” naturally would entail outcomes for the relevant resources and users 
beyond any observed pattern of social interactions in the action arena. In the same vein, a 
collective-action decision to enclose completely the information commons (e.g., by pro-
hibiting the creation or maintenance of a “creative commons”) would produce various 
predictable and unpredictable outcomes relative to the production and dissemination of 
information.
Ostrom and Hess provide an unfortunately misleading table of “potential positive 
or negative outcomes in various knowledge commons” (Hess & E. Ostrom 2007: 61, 
Table  3.1), which conflates outcomes with normative evaluations of those outcomes. 
For example, they treat enclosure as a “negative” outcome and maintenance of an infor-
mation commons as a “positive” outcome. This is presumptuous (and as noted above, 
contrary to their usual practice). It certainly is true that enclosure is an outcome of a 
proprietary (and gated) scientific database, and “open access” likewise is a consequence 
of an “open access research library.” However, whether one institutional arrangement 
is “positive,” “negative,” or preferable is a decidedly normative evaluation for which 
Ostrom and Hess provided no analysis. They should have been more circumspect. 
Normative assessments of outcomes as “positive” or “negative” will always be in the eye 
of the beholder, depending on her or his preferences, interests, and subjectively chosen 
(but hopefully expressly manifest) “evaluative criteria.” Even from a social perspective, 
a normative assessment of outcomes depends on the selection and application of inher-
ently contestable evaluative criteria.
In other words, the IAD framework itself provides no greater basis for normative 
presumptions about alternative governance systems for information than it provides for 
normative presumptions about alternative governance systems for natural common-pool 
resources. Depending on what function we are trying to maximize, it is entirely pos-
sible that neither entirely closed-access nor entirely open-access information systems 
would maximize it. From a social welfare perspective, some combination of open- and 
closed-access is overwhelmingly likely to be more socially efficient than complete open- 
or close-access (David 2003: 19). The trick, of course, would be getting the combination 
just right. And, again, the IAD framework itself will not help that determination, except 
to the extent applications of the framework result in meta-analyses that yield something 
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like the “design principles” Ostrom derived in Governing the Commons. In addition, the 
IAD framework can be said to facilitate evaluation by making it easy for evaluators to 
separate out the various elements that combine to affect outcomes.
7. Evaluative Criteria
In applying the IAD framework, we should not simply assume one or another social goal. 
It might or might not be social efficiency (on some definition). The “evaluative criteria” 
box in the IAD framework has long been the most neglected and underdeveloped ele-
ment of the framework. Even in her most elaborate account of the IAD framework, in 
Understanding Institutional Diversity, Ostrom devotes only three pages to a discussion 
of the “evaluative criteria” box, and offers only some general contenders for populating 
it, including (1) economic efficiency; (2) fiscal equivalence; (3) redistributional equity; 
(4) accountability; (5) conformance to values of local actors; and (6) sustainability. In 
the more specific context of the knowledge commons, Ostrom and Hess suggest (without 
citation) that six evaluative criteria are “frequently used”: (1) increasing scientific knowl-
edge; (2) sustainability and preservation; (3) participation standards; (4) economic effi-
ciency; (5)  equity through fiscal equivalence; and (6)  redistributional equity (Hess & 
E. Ostrom 2007: 63). They devote a paragraph to describing each discrete criterion (or 
set of criteria), amounting to just over three pages, without any detailed analysis of how 
any of the criteria would actually operate within the context of action situations, either 
separately or in combination with other evaluative criteria.
Ostrom’s lack of detailed and critical attention to the “evaluative criteria” in the IAD 
framework may reflect, more than anything else, her focus on natural common-pool 
resources, where little (if any) disagreement existed among diverse scholars about the ulti-
mate goal, which was universally assumed to be long-run resource sustainability. Ostrom, 
Hardin, Demsetz, and virtually every other scholar writing about common-pool resources 
concurs in ultimate aim, no matter how strongly they disagree about institutional means 
of achieving it. Consensus about ends makes for easier agreement on evaluative criteria 
for assessing alternative means (including privatization, public/state regulation of access 
and use, or local, common-property management) in various circumstances.
In other realms to which the IAD framework might usefully be applied, including 
the information or knowledge commons, there is unlikely to be agreement with respect 
to ultimate social goals. Some may argue that the ultimate goal of IP law is to reward 
innovators, in accordance with well-established property theories based on labor and just 
deserts, regardless of social welfare (Hughes 1988). Others might argue that the ultimate 
goal is to build the stock of useful knowledge to facilitate economic growth (representing 
a social-welfare function) (Kuznets 1965). Still others might assert that the goal is to dis-
seminate knowledge as widely as possible for its own sake (Hettinger 1989; Boyle 2003; 
but see Wagner 2003 (arguing that strong IP rights are more likely to ensure a flourishing 
public domain of ideas)).
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In the absence of consensus about ultimate ends, agreement on evaluative criteria for 
assessing means is unlikely (to say the least). As a consequence, individual scholars have 
greater freedom to select from among alternative evaluative criteria (at least within some 
conventional range) for adjudging the outcomes of social interactions. However, that 
freedom should be constrained by the general scientific principle that evaluative criteria 
must be clearly specified along with reasons for preferring them, either across the board or 
in the circumstances, so that the basis for evaluation can be understood and/or contested.
Somewhat more hopefully, scholars of the information commons, like scholars of the 
natural common-pool resources, might achieve consensus on a certain maximand (e.g., 
an agreed social-welfare function) for information and information-flows in society, 
which would enable a more fruitful focus on alternative institutional means of achieving 
that goal. Alternative presumptions and hypotheses about relations between institutional 
means and social outcomes could then be subject (at least potentially) to testing and 
comparison across runs of cases, as Ostrom did in Governing the Commons and her earlier 
studies of police department performance relative to size.
Finally, the evaluative criteria (however chosen) provide a basis for interpreting as well 
as evaluating outcomes. Those interpretations and evaluations become part of the feed-
back loop into resource systems, community attributes, and rules-in-use. When members 
of the relevant community evaluate outcomes of social interactions as “bad” (according 
to whatever criteria), they may push (successfully or unsuccessfully) for further action 
in subsequent action situations at the collective-choice level, to alter or curtail “bad” 
outcomes. Thus, the recursive aspect of the IAD framework accounts for institutional 
change (or inertia) over time (even though the framework cannot by itself determine, 
ensure, or even predict institutional change).
IV. Conclusion
IP scholars already have begun applying the IAD framework to good effect. Charlotte 
Hess, writing with Elinor Ostrom and on her own, has been a pioneer in calling for 
application of the framework to problems of the information or knowledge commons 
(see, e.g., Hess & E. Ostrom 2003, 2006, 2007; Hess 2005, 2008). Charles Schweik has 
applied the IAD framework to “software commons” (Schweik 2005; Schweik & English 
2007). Josh Tenenberg has applied it to study software development teams (Tenenberg 
2008). And Jorge Contreras, in this volume and elsewhere, applies the IAD framework 
to the “genome commons” (Contreras, this volume, ch. 4; Contreras 2011). Other schol-
ars might examine these groundbreaking efforts to assess whether the framework might 
usefully be applied to their own problems and projects.
These are still early days in the social-scientific study of information as a good, whether 
public, common, or private. But, as noted earlier, students of the information or knowl-
edge commons should not expect quick and decisive results about appropriate governance 
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institutions. That is one of the chief lessons of the large and growing literature on natural 
common-pool resources. After several decades of data collection and careful construction 
of analytical frameworks, theories, and methods to analyze and diagnose commons prob-
lems, much has been learned but probably not nearly as much as remains to be learned.
Thanks primarily to Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at the Ostrom Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis, we have learned that common-property regimes 
are a viable third category of governance regimes for successfully managing natural 
common-pool resources over long periods of time.21 And we have gained some idea of the 
conditions under which common-property regimes seem more or less likely to succeed 
based on the “design principles” Ostrom derived from her meta-analyses of hundreds of 
individual cases. Since then, despite increasing data collection and efforts to improve ana-
lytical methods, further progress toward understanding and diagnosing (let alone resolv-
ing) commons problems has been marginal (though hardly insignificant).
Scant reason exists to expect easier and more rapid progress toward describing, diag-
nosing, and explaining issues relating to information and information-flows. Indeed, as 
noted earlier, important questions remain about just how applicable the existing litera-
ture of natural common-pool resources is to the information commons. Even when infor-
mation arises or is placed in common pools, it may not have the same kinds of attributes 
of natural resources found in common pools. As defined many years ago by Vincent and 
Elinor Ostrom, common-pool resources share certain attributes with public goods, but 
are not themselves pure public goods. Specifically, they lack nonrivalrousness in con-
sumption, which is to say they are subtractable or congestible. This is not true of informa-
tion (though it may be true of the various vehicles by which information is provided or 
disseminated). Thus, whereas “open access” is potentially tragic, and only very rarely pref-
erable,22 for a natural resource commons, IP scholars often make arguments promoting 
“open access” (see, e.g., Willinsky 2006; Swan 2007). And those arguments make sense in 
that context (even if they are not completely convincing) to the extent that information 
approximates a pure public good.
Even if the natural resource commons and the information commons were more sim-
ilar than they are, IP scholars hoping to find support for normative arguments about 
the preferability of common-property management (let  alone full-blown open access) 
will not find much in the work of Elinor Ostrom and others employing her frameworks, 
theories, and models. As argued in the first part of this chapter, Ostrom’s own normative 
commitments were few and contingent; her work on natural common-pool resources 
never argued as a general rule that common-property regimes were preferable to private, 
individual property systems or public property/regulatory systems. It was only in specific 
21 That is, of course, the primary lesson of Ostrom’s Governing the Commons (1990).
22 Arguably, “open access” is optimal (that is, preferable to all alternative property/regulatory systems) for natural 
resource commons only so long as the rate of demand remains quite low relative to the supply—that is to say, 
prior to some known or presumed congestion point. See Cole (2002); Frischmann (2012: ch. 11).
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circumstances that we might (or might not) find that one type of property/regulatory 
regime functioned as well as or better than others. She would surely caution IP scholars 
not to expect to find panacea solutions for problems of the information or knowledge 
commons.
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